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ELECTIONS-RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE AND REGULATION
THEREOF-OFFICIAL BALLOTS; VALIDITY OF BALLOT ACCESS AND
BALLOT POSITION RESTRICTIONS
Harley McLain, an independent candidate in North Dakota's
1978 general election,' brought an action to challenge three North
Dakota election statutes,2 alleging that his first and fourteenth
amendment rights had been violated. The United States District
1. McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159, 1160 (8th Cir. 1980). McLain ran as an independent
candidate for North Dakota's congressional seat. In the summer of 1978 he attempted to file as the
party candidate for "Chemical Farming Banned," a political group organized by McLain. Id. at
1161. He was disqualified as a new party candidate because he failed to submit 15,000 signatures
before the June 1 deadline. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 16-04-20 (4) (1971) (current version at N.D.
CENT. CODE 5 16.1-11-30 (4) (Interim Supp. 1981)); see also explanatory reference in note 2 infra.
McLain was, however, able to qualify as an independent, non-party candidate by submitting 300
signatures not less than 40 days before the general election. N.D. CENT. CODE S 16-03-02 (1971)
(current version at N.D. CENT. CODE S 16.1-11-39 (Interim Supp. 1981)); when McLain first viewed
the ballot, he registered a complaint that each independent candidate was not given a separate
column on the ballot. Id. at 1161-62.
2. The statutes provide:
The following political parties shall be provided with separate columns on
primary election ballots:
1. The Republican party;
2. The Democrat party;
3. Any party which cast five percent of the total votes cast for governor at the last
general election; and
4. Any other party, if a petition signed byfifteen thousand or more electors of this state is filed
with the secretary of state before four o'clock p.m. onJune first qf any primary election year,
asking that a column be provided.for such party, naming it, and stating the platform
principles thereof. If such petition is mailed it shall be in the possession of the secretary of
state before four o 'clock p.m. onjunefirst. Candidates of such party shall be entitled to the
same rghts and privilges as those of other parties.
Columns shall be arranged so that any column shall be in an inverted position when
the adjacent column or columns are in an upright position.
N.D. CENT. CODE 5 16-04-20 (1971) (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE S 16.1-11-30 (Interim
Supp. 1981)) (emphasis added).
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Court for the District of North Dakota dismissed the complaint,
finding that the statutes were reasonably related to legitimate state
interests and that they did not violate any constitutional rights. 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
in part and affirming in part, held that North Dakota's ballot access
restrictions 4  were unnecessarily oppressive, and hence
unconstitutional,5 and that the favoritism of the "incumbent first"
statute6 burdened the fundamental right to vote in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. 7 The court found, however, that the
ballot arrangement of the independent column statute8 was a
The ballot provided for in section 16-11-05 shall be arranged as follows: The names
of the candidates of the party casting the highest number of votes in the state for members of Congress
at the last preceding general election shall be arranged in the first or left-hand column of such ballot;
of the party casting the next highest number of votes in the second column; of the party
casting the next highest number of votes in the third column; and of such other party
as the secretary of state may direct for state officers. In presidential years, the names of
electors of president and vice-president of the United States, presented in one
certificate of nomination, shall be arranged in a group enclosed in brackets to the right
and opposite the center of which shall be printed in bold type the surname of the
presidential candidate represented. To the right and in a line with such surname, near
the margin, shall be placed a single square, and a mark within such square shall be
designated a vote for all the electors, and such group shall be placed at the head of the
column under the party designated or represented in such certificate.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-11-06 (1971) (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE 5 16.1-06-07.1 (Interim
Supp. 1981)) (emphasis added).
The official ballots provided for in this title for partisan election at general
elections in precincts in which voting machines are not used shall be prepared as
follows:
1. The ballots shall be of sufficient width to contain all of the tickets to be voted
for, under the appropriate party designation for each;
2. On the left-hand side of such ballot shall be a column designating the office to
be voted for, and on the same line, in the column under the appropriate party
designation of each, all of the names of the candidates duly nominated for that
office shall be printed;
3. The names of candidates under headings designating each official position
shall be alternated on the official ballot in the printing in the same manner as is
provided in the primary election ballot;
4. The names of all persons nominated by petition shall be placed in one column under the
designation of "independent nominations" in the lines respectively specifying the officesfor
which they are nominated, and
5. The size of type shall be as specified by the secretary of state.
In precincts in which voting machines are used, the list of offices and candidates
and the statements of measures and questions to be submitted to the voters shall be
arranged in a manner and form approximating as far as possible the requirements of
this section.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 16-11-05 (1971) (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-06-05 (Interim
Supp. 1981)) (emphasis added).
The statutes dealt with in McLain have since been repealed and replaced by North Dakota
Century Code title 16.1 (Interim Supp. 1981). A discussion of the current versions of these statutes is
contained in note 128 infra.
3. McLain v. Meier, 496 F. Supp. 462, 469, 473 (D.N.D. 1980).
4. N.D. CENT. CODE S 16-04-20 (4) (1971) (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE S 16.1-11-30
(4) (Interim Supp. 1981)). This statute will be referred to as North Dakota's "ballot access" statute.
5. McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159, 1165 (8th Cir. 1980).
6. N.D. CENT. CODE S 16-11-06 (1971) (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE S 16.1-06-07.1
(Interim Supp. 1981)). This statute will be referred to as North Dakota's "incumbent first" statute.
7. 637 F.2d at 1167.
8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-11-05 (1971) (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE 5 16.1-06-05
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matter of choice for the state, and was therefore constitutionally
permissible as written. 9 McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir.
1980).
The three statutes challenged in McLain concerned two distinct
restrictions on political candidates-ballot access and ballot
position. The constitutional problems fostered by these restrictions
have plagued the courts for some time. Williams v. Rhodes10 was the
United States Supreme Court's first major decision involving ballot
access restrictions. Under an Ohio law a new political party seeking
ballot access had to obtain signatures from fifteen percent of the
voters in the last gubernatorial election, and had to file these
petitions early in February of the election year.11 The Williams
Court found that, because the fundamental rights to associate and
to cast votes effectively were involved, the statute would have to be
examined under a strict scrutiny standard of review, and therefore,
the State would have to show a compelling interest for the
legislation.12 The state interests in preserving the two-party
system, 13 forcing a confrontation of candidates in the primary, 14
assuring a majority vote to the winner, 15 and preventing voter
confusion, 16 were found insufficient to show any compelling
interest for the burden placed on candidates' access to the ballot. 17
Since the State had failed to show any compelling interest, the
statute was invalidated. 1 8
The United States Supreme Court again addressed the issue of
ballot access restrictions in Jenness v. Fortson. 19 Jenness involved a
challenge to a Georgia statute that required third parties and
independent candidates to file nominating petitions containing
signatures from five percent of the registered voters in the last
general election for that office, in order to gain access to the general
election ballot. 20 Unlike the Williams Court, the Court inJenness did
(Interim Supp. 1981)). This statute will be referred to as North Dakota's "independent column"
statute.
9. 637 F.2d at 1169.
10. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
11. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24-28 (1968) (citing OHio REv. CODE ANN. S 3517.01
(Page 1960)). The Ohio American Independent Party, which was formed in January of 1968, had
secured the 15% signature requirement, but was denied placement on the ballot because the
February filing deadline had expired. 393 U.S. at 26-27. The Socialist Labor Party could not meet
the 15% signature requirement. Both parties challenged the Ohio election laws as violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 26.
12. Id. at 31.
13. Id. at 31-32.
14. Id. at 32-33.
15. Id. at 32.
16. Id. at33.
17. Id. at 31.
18. Id. at 34.
19. 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
20. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 432 (1971). In Jenness the Court defined "political
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not discuss the alleged infringement of fundamental rights. Instead,
theJenness Court compared the burden on candidate access created
by the Georgia statute it was addressing and that of the statute at
issue in Williams. It determined that the Georgia legislation
entailed a less restrictive burden to access, which in no way froze
the political status quo. 21 TheJenness Court seemed to require only
a rational connection between the state's interests and the purpose
of the statute; 22 it recognized an important state interest in
requiring some showing of a "significant modicum of support"
before printing the candidate's name on an election ballot. The
Court also acknowledged the state's legitimate interest in
preventing voter confusion. 23 Thus, the Court held that the statute
imposed no arbitrary restrictions on candidates and upheld the five
percent signature requirement. 2
4
In Bullock v. Carter25  the Court further explained the
relationship between fundamental rights and restrictions on
candidacies. The Court noted that it had never attached "such
fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of
review. "26 Instead, it advocated examining the candidate
parties" as those parties which received at least 20% of the vote in the last gubernatorial or
presidential election, and advanced the winner of their primary to the subsequent general election.
Id. at 433-34 (citing GA. ConE ANN. § 34-1010 (1970)). A third party or independent candidate could
have his name printed on the general election ballot by filing the nominating petition. The time
allowed for circulating the petitions was 180 days. Id. at 433 (citing GA. Con ANN. 5 34-1010
(1970)). The petitions had to be filed on the second Wednesday in June, the same deadline that a
candidate filing in a party primary was required to meet. Id. at 433-34.
21. Id. at 438. The reasoning of the Court was stated:
But the Williams case, it is clear, presented a statutory scheme vastly different
from the one before us here. Unlike Ohio, Georgia freely provides for write-in votes.
U nlike Ohio, Georgia does not require every candidate to be the nominee of a political
party, but fully recognizes independent candidacies. Unlike Ohio, Georgia does not
fix an unreasonably early filing deadline for candidates not endorsed by established
parties. Unlike Ohio, Georgia does not impose upon a small party or a new party the
Procrustean requirement of establishing elaborate primary election machinery.
Finally, and in sum, Georgia's election laws, unlike Ohio's, do not operate to freeze
the political status quo. In this setting we cannot say that Georgia's 5% petition
requirement violates the Constitution.
Id.
22. Id. at 4 4 2 . The Court stated:
There is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing
of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political
organization's candidate on the ballot-the interest, if no other, in avoiding
confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general
election.
Id.
23. Id. But cf Williams, 393 U.S. at 33 (rejecting prevention of voter confusion as a valid state
interest).
24. 403 U.S. at 442.
25. 405 U.S. 134 (1972). Under Texas law a candidate must pay a filing fee as a condition to
having his name placed on the ballot in the primary election. Id. at 135 (citing TEx. ELEC. CODE
ANN. arts. 13.07a, 13.08, 13.08a, 13.15, and 13.16 (Vernon Supp. 1971)). The statutory scheme
provided no alternative methods of access, and additionally required payment of fees as high as
$8,900. Id. at 134-40.
26. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972).
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restrictions in terms of the extent of the burden placed on the
voters' free choice. 27
Storer v. Brown28 and American Party of Texas v. White9 were
decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1974, withJustice
White writing both opinions for the Court. The minority parties
and independent candidates in Storer and American Party asserted
that the ballot restrictions in question violated their associational
rights and denied them equal protection under the laws. 30 In both
cases the majority noted that ballot access restrictions had to be
''necessary to further compelling state interests ' 31 that "cannot
be served equally well in significantly less burdensome ways. '"32
Although the "compelling interest" test was recognized by the
Court, neither Storer nor American Party discussed any individual
fundamental rights impaired by the ballot access restrictions.
The California statutes challenged in Storer required that all
independent candidates be disaffiliated from a qualified political
party for one year.3 3 They also required that an independent
candidate's nominating petitions be signed by qualified voters
totaling at least five percent of the entire vote cast in the preceding
general election. 34 All signatures had to be obtained in a twenty-
four day period following the primary. 35  The Storer Court
enunciated a new test for the signature requirement and filing
deadline restrictions. It suggested that courts consider whether a
"reasonably diligent independent candidate" could be expected to
meet the requirements and gain access to the ballot. 36 When
27. Id. at 143. The Court stated that "[i]n approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to
examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of their impact on voters." Id.
28. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
29. 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
30. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 727, 729 (1974); American Party of Texas v. White, 415
U.S. 767, 771 (1974).
31. 415 U.S. at 780, 780 n. Il (citingAmerican Party, 415 U.S. at 729-33).
32. 415 U.S. at 781. In Storer the Court implicitly recognized that the state must use the least
alternative means to accomplish its goals. 415 U.S. at 736. The disaffiliation statute, however, was
not subjected to the more thorough analysis used in American Party because alternative means for
ballot access were available to independent candidates through the write-in statute. Id. at 736 n.7.
33. 415 U.S. at 726 (citing CAL. ELEC. CODE 5 6830 (d) (West Supp. 1974)). The California
Elections Code prohibits an independent candidate from obtaining a position on the ballot if he had a
registered affiliation with a qualified political party within one year prior to the immediately
preceding primary election. Id.
34. Id. at 726-27 (citing CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6831 (West 1961)).
35. Id. (citing CAL. ELEC. ConE S 6833 (West Supp. 1974)).
36. 415 U.S. at 742. The test developed by the Court was stated as follows:
[Clould a reasonably diligent independent candidate be expected to satisfy the
signature requirements, or will it be only rarely that the unaffiliated candidate will
succeed in getting on the ballot? Past experience will be a helpful, if not always an
unerring, guide: it will be one thing if independent candidates have qualified with
some regularity and quite a different matter if they have not.
Id. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1977). (Maryland statutes required nominating
petitions signed by 3% of the state's registered voters to be filed 70 days before the party primary in
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candidate qualifications are at issue, the Court recognized the
legitimate state interest of requiring a significant modicum of
support.3 7 Relying on Jenness, the Court also recognized the state
interests of avoiding voter confusion, assuring that the winner is the
choice of the majority, and protecting the integrity of the political
process. 38  The Court upheld the one year disaffiliation
requirement, stating that the prevention of government
factionalism and party splintering furthers the compelling state
interest of political stability. 39
In American Party the Court addressed a Texas law that
provided for four methods of nominating candidates in the general
election. 40 Candidates of parties whose gubernatorial choice polled
more than 200,000 votes in the last general election were
nominated by primary elections only. 41 Candidates whose parties
polled less than 200,000, but more than two percent of the total
vote cast for governor, were nominated by primary election or
nominating conventions. 42 If the first two methods did not apply,
precinct conventions could nominate party .candidates, and if the
required support was not evidenced at the conventions, signature
petitions were required. 43 Finally, independent candidates could
qualify by filing a petition containing signatures of a specified
percentage of the last gubernatorial vote. 44 The American Party of
Texas challenged the third method, which required either a
nominating convention or a one percent signature requirement. 45
The Court again acknowledged the state's legitimate interests of
preventing voter confusion, protecting the integrity of the electoral
process, and requiring a significant modicum of support. 46 The
requirement that minority parties hold nominating conventions
was upheld because majority parties followed an equally
burdensome procedure in the primary election. 47 Similarly, the one
order for an independent candidate to qualify for the general election ballot). The Mandel Court
accepted the Storer test of a "reasonably diligent independent candidate" and remanded the case for
application of that test. Id.
37. 415 U.S. at 732.
38. Id. at 732-33 (citingjenness, 403 U.S. at 442).
39. 415 U.S. at 736. The Court remanded the signature requirement and filing deadline
challenges for proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. at 746. The Court lacked information on
the number of signatures required in the 24-day period, and the total pool from which they could be
drawn. Id. at 742.
40. 415 U.S. at 772-75.
41. Id. at 772 (citing TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. arts. 13.02, .03 (Vernon 1967)).
42. Id. at 773 (citing TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 13.45 (1) (Vernon 1973)).
43. Id. at 774 (citing TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 13.45 (2) (Vernon Supp. 1973)).
44. Id. at 775 (citing TEx. ELEC. CODE ANN. arts. 13.50, .51 (Vernon 1967)).
45. 415 U.S. at 777-80.
46. Id. at 782, 782 n.14.
47. Id. at 781. The Court considered the suggestion that the state has invidiously discriminated
against the smaller parties by insisting that their nominations be by convention, rather than by
primary election. Id. Rejecting the suggestion, the Court stated:
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percent signature requirement was upheld because the majority
parties also had to show significant support among voters to be
placed on the general election ballot. 48 The Court concluded by
noting that Texas election laws "in no way [freeze] the status
quo . . ." because they provide minority parties a real and equal
opportunity for ballot access.4 9
The most recent ballot access case decided by the United
States Supreme Court was Illinois Elections Board v. Socialist Workers
Party.50 Illinois law required new politcal parties and independent
candidates to obtain 25,000 signatures to qualify for the ballot in
statewide elections. 51  Moreover, a five percent signature
requirement was mandated for ballot access in state subdivision
elections. 52 The application of the latter provision to a Chicago
mayoral election produced the result that a new party or
independent candidate needed substantially more signatures than
would be needed for ballot access in a statewide election. 53
Significantly, the Court recognized the importance of fundamental
rights, 54 which had not been thoroughly discussed by the Court in
the ballot access cases since Williams. 5 5 In finding that the vital
individual rights to associate and to cast votes effectively were at
stake, the Court applied a compelling interest test. 56 The Court
acknowledged the state's legitimate interest in regulating ballot
access and, thus, in designing means for measuring candidate
[W]e are wholly unpersuaded by the record before us that the convention process is
invidiously more burdensome than the primary election, followed by a runoff election
where necessary, particularly where the major party, in addition to the elections, must
also hold its precinct, county, and state conventions to adopt and promulgate party
platforms and to conduct other business.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Court also recognized that statutes may permissibly create different
classifications; it is only "invidious discrimination" which violates the equal protection clause. Id.
48. Id. at 782-83.
49. Id. at 787-88. The Court stated:
In sum, Texas "in no way freezes the status quo, but implicitly recognizes the
potential fluidity of American political life." It affords minority political parties a real
and essential equal opportunity for ballot qualification. Neither the First and
Fourteenth Amendments nor the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires any more.
Id. (citation omitted).
50. 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
51. Id. at 175 (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, S 10-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978)).
52. Id. at 176 (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 10-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978)).
53. Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 177 (1979).
54. Id. at 184. The Court stated that two fundamental rights were burdened by restrictions on
access to the ballot: the freedom to associate for advancement of political beliefs, and the right of
voters to cast their votes effectively. Id. In concluding its discussion of fundamental rights, the Court
stated that, "for reasons too self-evident to warrant amplification here, we have often reiterated that
voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure." Id.
55. 393 U.S. at 30. The freedom to associate and the right to.vote effectively were discussed by
the Court. Both were ranked "among our most precious freedoms." Id.
56. 440 U.S. at 184. "When such vital individual rights are at stake, a State must establish that
its classification is necessary to serve a compelling interest." Id.
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seriousness by requiring a showing by the candidate or party of a
"significant modicum of support. ", 57 The state may not, however,
unnecessarily restrict individual liberties. It must adopt the "least
drastic means" to achieve the state's objectives. 8 The Court struck
down the statutes, finding no compelling state interest for the
restriction and that the state had not used the least restrictive means
available. 59
Ballot access jurisprudence has undergone considerable
development since 1968, when the United States Supreme Court
decided Williams v. Rhodes. 60 Confusion has resulted, however, due
to the Court's failure to enunciate a consistent standard of review
for ballot access cases. 6 The Court began with a "strict scrutiny"
analysis in Williams, 62 but then apparently retreated to a "rational
basis" test in Jenness.6a The Storer Court applied the "compelling
interest" test, but added the "reasonably diligent candidate"
57. Id. at 185. The State has an interest in assuring that the winner of an election is the choice of
the majority, or at least a strong plurality. Consequently, statutes which require a showing of a
"significant modicum of support" before placing a candidate or party on the ballot have been upheld
by the Court. Id. Seejenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. at 442 (finding that some preliminary showing of a
significant modicum of support avoids confusion, deception, and even frustration of the electoral
process); see, e.g., American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. at 789.
58. 440 U.S. at 185. See MacBride v. Exon, 558 F.2d 443, 448 (8th Cir. 1977). "The measures
adopted by a state may not go beyond what the state's compelling interests actually require, and
broad and stringent restrictions or requirements cannot stand where more moderate ones would do
as well." Id. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 30-31.
59. 440 U.S. at 186. The Court stated that the signature requirements for Chicago city elections
"are plainly not the least restrictive means of protecting the State's objectives." Id. In striking down
the statute, the Court noted that the State "has advanced no reason, much less a compelling one,
why the State needs a more stringent requirement for Chicago." Id.
60. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
61. Neither the courts nor legal scholars have been able to clearly enunciate a consistent
standard of review for ballot access restrictions. The most recent Eighth Circuit decision, prior to
McLain v. Meier, applied the compelling interest test. In MacBride v. Exon, 558 F.2d 443 (8th Cir.
1977), a Nebraska statute required independent candidates to obtain signatures from one percent of
the voters in the last gubernatorial election and to certify those petitions 90 days before the primary
election (nine months before the general election). Id. at 446 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. §5 32-4,108,
32-504, 32-526, 32-556 (1943)). The court mentioned that restrictive measures must be supported by
a compelling interest, and the least restrictive means must be used to accomplish the statutes'
objectives. Id. at 448. The court noted that the statute arbitrarily restricted voters from voting for the
candidates of their choice, and that it was no defense to argue that all political parties face the same
obstacle. Id. at 449. The most significant problem presented by the Nebraska statute was the absence
of an alternative means to get on the ballot. Id. Thus, although the state has a compelling interest in
requiring a petition to show the sincerity of the candidacy, and to show voter support for the
candidate, a state cannot completely prohibit access to the ballot by not offering any alternative
means of access. Id. It is important to note that this opinion was written by Circuit Judge Henley,
who also wrote the opinion in McLain v. Meier. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.
Ohio 1980) (applying the compelling interest test and containing an analysis of the very recent lower
court decisions); Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F. Supp. 730 (D. Me. 1980) (compelling interest test). Cf
Hall v. Austin, 495 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (applies the "reasonable diligence" test of
Storer).
Discussion of the various principles involving ballot access may be found in the following
commentaries: Elder, Access to the Ballot by Political Candidates, 83 DIcx. L. REV. 387 (1979); Note, A
New Dimension to Equal Protection and Access to the Ballot: American Party v. White and Storer v. Brown, 24
AM. U.L. REV. 1293 (1975); Note, Nominating Petition Requirements for Third-Party and Independent
Candidate Ballot Access, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 974 (1977); Developments in the Law - Elections, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1114-1212 (1974).
62. See supra notes 10 to 18, and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 19 to 24, and accompanying text.
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test. 64 The Court also used the "compelling interest" test in
American Party, but it added the inquiry of whether the political
status quo had been frozen by the challenged ballot access
provision. 65 Finally, in Illinois Board, the Court applied a stricter
"compelling interest" test based upon its finding that fundamental
rights were implicated.6 6 The apparent inconsistency of the
standard of review applied by the Court in these decisions arguably
indicates that the Court may continue to analyze ballot access
restrictions on a case-by-case basis.
A second burden that may be placed on a political
candidate's potential for success in an election is the regulation of
ballot position. Statutes regulating ballot position generally provide
that the incumbent candidates are to be placed first on the ballot,
thereby denying to other candidates whatever vote advantage there
may be in holding the first position. 67 Ballot position statutes are
usually challenged as violative of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, on the theory that they unreasonably
discriminate against nonincumbent candidates.
Two distinct trends have developed in the analysis of ballot
position regulations. The first trend has been developed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.6 8 To
determine the constitutionality of ballot placement procedures
under the equal protection clause, the Seventh Circuit adopted a
two-part test. First, the plaintiff must show that the top placement
on the ballot has an advantageous effect in an election. Second, the
plaintiff must prove an "intentional or purposeful
discrimination. "69 This test was applied in Sangmeister v.
Woodward, 70 a case in which the court declared unconstitutional the
Illinois county clerks' practice of placing their party's candidate
first on the ballot. 71
64. See supra notes 28 to 39, and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 40 to 49, and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 50 to 59, and accompanying text.
67. For discussion of the vote advantage attributed to the first position on the ballot, see Taebel,
The Effect of Ballot Position on Electoral Success, 19 AM. J. POL. Sci. 519 (1975); Note, Equal Protection in
Ballot Positioning, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 816 (1975); Note, Caihfornia Ballot Position Statutes: An
UnconstitutionalAdvantage to Incumbents, 45 So. CAL. L. REv. 365 (1972).
68. Bohus v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 447 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1971).
69. Id. at 822.
70. 565 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1977).
71. Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565 F.2d 460, 467 (7th Cir. 1977). The court of appeals found
sufficient evidence of ballot position advantage. Id. at 466. Although the court was uncertain of the
exact proof requirements of "intentional or purposeful discrimination," it decided that the facts of
the case must certainly satisfy that requirement. Id. at 467. Seeking to support its conclusion the
court pointed out "that the practice at issue here has been carried out for at least 100 years in
DuPage, 40 years in Will and 30 years in Cook County." Id. "Such systematic and widespread
exclusionary practices by State officials satisfy even the strictest intent requirement." Id.
The Seventh Circuit recently upheld an Illinois ballot position statute by applying the Bohus test
in Board of Election Comm'rs v. Libertarian Party, 591 F.2d 22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 918
503
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The other trend, which applies a rational basis test, has had a
more widespread application. Williamson v. Fortson72 dealt with a
Georgia statute which required that the incumbency of a
candidate be indicated on the ballot. 73 The court applied a rational
basis test,74 and found that the statute was justified as an attempt to
provide useful information to ill-informed voters. 75 Gould v. Grubb76
was another ballot position case that involved a challenge to an
"incumbent first" statute. Reasoning that the fundamental right to
vote was infringed by the statute, 77 the court in Gould applied a
strict scrutiny test and invalidated the statute. 78 Clough v. Guzzi 7 9
was also a case involving a challenge to an "incumbent first"
statute. The court in Clough specifically rejected Gould and found
insufficient impact on the right to vote to warrant the strict scrutiny
standard; therefore, the court applied the rational basis test. 80 The
state interests of using the "incumbent first" method as an
informational device and as a way to avoid voter confusion were
found sufficient to uphold the statute.8' A ballot position statute
was also recently upheld in Socialist Workers Party v. March Fong Eu. 8
2
(1979). Cook County proposed a "two-tier" ballot placement plan that placed "established political
parties" in the top ballot positions, and "new political parties" below the establishment political
parties in the order in which they filed their petitions. Id. at 23. Although the two-tier system
consistently placed the Democratic and Republican parties in the first two positions, the court found
no showing of an intentional or purposeful discrimination. Id. at 25. It upheld the statute, stating
that "[aill the evidence in the record supports the conclusion that its purpose was to prevent voter
confusion, to serve voter convenience, and less important but still relevant, to aid in the convenient
tallying of results." Id.
72. 376 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
73. Williamson v. Fortson, 376 F. Supp. 1300, 1301 (N.D..Ga. 1974).
74. Id. The court recognized the discrimination present, but found that it was not invidious and
could be supported by rational state interests. Id. at 1301-02. "This discrimination, however, is not
grounded in a suspect classification, and the statute need only satisfy the 'rational basis' test in order
to avoid constitutional infirmity." Id. at 1303.
75. Id. The rational basis test was met because the State "advanced as a justification for the
statute a claim that it represents an attempt to provide useful information to ill-informed voters." Id.
76. 14 Cal. 3d 661, 536 P.2d 1337, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975).
77. Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 670, 536 P.2d 1337, 1343, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377, 383 (1975).
The court found that the "classification scheme imposes a very 'real and appreciable impact' on the
equality, fairness, and integrity of the electoral process." Id. It also found that "the challenged
provision effectively undermines the fundamental democratic electoral tenet of a majority rule." Id.
78. Id. at 673, 536 P.2d at 1344, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 384. The court stated "that the instant
classification scheme, which substantially dilutes the weight of votes of those supporting
nonincumbent candidates, must be subjected to 'strict judicial scrutiny.' " Id. The only compelling
interest asserted by the State was that placing all incumbents at the top of the ballot facilitated
efficient, unconfused voting. Id. Since the State could have employed less discriminatory alternatives
to accomplish its goal, the statute was found unconstitutional. Id. at 673-74, 536 P.2d at 1345, 122
Cal. Rptr. at 385.
79. 416 F. Supp. 1057, 1058-59 (D. Mass. 1976) (statute challenged in Clough placed
incumbents first on the ballot) (citing MASS GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 53, SS 34, 45, ch. 54 5 33, 41, 42
(West 1975)).
80. Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057, 1067 (D. Mass. 1976). Clough rejected the reasoning of
Gould, stating that the actual dilution of votes cannot be accurately measured. The dilution effect is
attenuated because "non-incumbents and their supporters have access to those voters and may ...
so educate them as to eliminate the donkey vote and thus eliminate the statistical position bias." Id
81. Id. at 1068. In recognizing that the designation of incumbency was material, the court
stated, "[Tihe fact that some statistical advantage may at the same time accrue to one of the
candidates by virtue of his or her incumbency does not for constitutional purposes invalidate that
otherwise legitimate purpose .... " Id.
82. 591 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1979).
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In that case a California law specified that independent candidates
be designated only as "independent" on the general election ballot,
which precluded the designation of any party affiliation.83 The
court applied the rational basis test because it had found no
impairment of fundamental rights.8 4 The court upheld the statute,
finding it rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in
regulating its electoral process.85 Thus, with the exception of the
Seventh Circuit, the rational basis test is accepted as the proper
standard of review for ballot position restrictions. 86
The North Dakota ballot access and ballot position statutes
were challenged in McLain v. Meier. 87 The court first addressed the
challenge to the ballot access statute,8 8 and found that "the
fundamental right to vote is inseparable from the right to have the
candidate of one's choice on the ballot.' '89 Relying on the recent
United States Supreme Court decision in Illinois Board"° and the
prior Eighth Circuit case of MacBride v. Exon, 91 the court adopted a
compelling interest test. The court acknowledged the difficulty with
ballot access analysis when it noted that the appropriate standard of
review is not always easy to discern. 92 Although the court adopted
the MacBride compelling interest test, the basis of the court's
83. 591 F.2d at 1254 (citing CAL. ELEC. CODE 510210 (West 1977)).
84. 591 F.2d at 1261.
85. Id. at 1262.
86. Other courts have also applied a rational basis test. The court in Ulland v. Growe, 262
N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978), rejected the strict scrutiny approach of Gould and applied the rational
basis test enunciated in Clough. Id. at 416-17. The court found that, since the Minnesota statutes
were less burdensome than those in Clough, the rational basis test must be applied. Id. at 417. Finding
that the state has an interest in identifying the major party candidates for the voters, the court stated
that "[t]he method selected by the legislature to assist partisan voters in locating their candidates on
the ballot cannot be overturned by this court merely because we think a rotational system would be
marginally more fair." Id. at 418. Krasnoffv. Hardy, 436 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. La. 1977), involved a
claim by an independent candidate that the voting machine ballot gave an advantage to Democratic
and Republican candidates in violation of the equal protection clause. Id. at 306-07. The court
adopted the reasoning of Clough and proceeded to "determine whether Louisiana has a legitimate,
rational reason for treating [the plaintiff] differently from the major parties' candidates." Id. at 308.
The advantage conferred by the incumbency position was viewed as minimal and did not outweigh
the State's interest in revealing which candidates on the ballot are incumbents, and in placing the
incumbents in the first position. Id. (citations omitted).
87. 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1980).
88. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 16-04-20(4) (1971) (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE S 16.1-11-
30(4) (Interim Supp. 1981)). The ballot access statute provides for a single method of ballot access for
a "new" political party. Such a party must file a petition signed by 15,000 North Dakota voters
(equalling approximately 3 Y3 % of North Dakota's electorate). The filing deadline is more than 90
days before the primary election. N.D. CENT. CODE S 16-04-01 (1971) (current version at N.D.
CENT. CODE S 16.1-11-30(4) (Interim Supp. 1981)).
89. 637 F.2d at 1163.
90. 440 U.S. 173 (1979). The McLain court relied on Illinois Board for the proposition that voting
is a fundamental right. The court in Illinois Board stated that "we have often reiterated that voting is
of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure. "Id. at 184.
91. 558 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1977). The McLain decision was written by the same judge who
rendered the MacBride decision (Circuit Judge Henley). Id. at 445. The test used in MacBride for
ballot access restrictions was that such restrictions "must be reasonable and must be justified by
reference to a compelling state interest." Id. at 448.
92. 637 F.2d at 1163.
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analysis in McLain was apparently derived from Storer.93 The
McLain court stated that, when addressing the ballot access issue,
courts must consider the history of restrictions created by the ballot
access law, the individual interests of the candidates, and the
interests the State claims to be protecting. 94
The McLain court began its analysis of the North Dakota ballot
access law by considering the statute's past effect on third party
candidacies. The court applied the Storer "reasonably diligent
candidate" test when it examined the past success of third party
candidates. 95 It found that no third party candidate had regularly
qualified for a ballot position in the last thirty years, regardless of
how "diligent" an individual candidate may have been. 96 Thus,
the court concluded that the statute's history established that it was
too restrictive 97 and thereby created an undue burden on third
party access to the ballot. 98 Turning to a second area of analysis,
the court examined the individual interests of the candidates
affected by the ballot access law. It discussed the impact of the
signature requirement and filing deadline on candidates' rights. 99
In its discussion of the signature requirement under the North
Dakota law, the court attempted to distinguish Jenness by noting
that the three and one-third percent requirement is lower than the
five percent requirement held valid by the United States Supreme
Court in Jenness.100 Additionally, the court noted that only four
states had percentage signature requirements as high as North
Dakota's. 101 The court looked to American Party, in which the
Supreme Court indicated that a one percent signature requirement
might be the maximum showing of support the state could
justify. 102 While the McLain court found weaknesses in the three
and one-third percent signature requirement, it recognized that the
holding in Jenness precluded an invalidation of the North Dakota
93. 415 U.S. 724(1974).
94. 637 F.2d at 1163 (citingStorer, 415 U.S. at 730).
95. 637 F.2d at 1165 (citingStorer, 415 U.S. at 742).
96. 637 F.2d at 1165. An affidavit from an American Party candidate who had participated in
past North Dakota elections indicated that the burden placed on these candidates is quite severe. He
testified that "[i]n order to obtain 15,000 signatures, you have to contact many, many more than
that number in order to obtain the required number .. " Id. The affiant indicated that well over
1,500 man hours were needed to obtain 15,000 signatures. Id.
97. Id. The court in McLain followed Storer's use of experience as a helpful guide. 415 U.S. at
742; see supra note 36.
98. 637 F.2d at 1165.
99. Id. at 1164-65.
100. Id. at 1163 (citing Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971)).
101. 637 F.2d at 1163 n.9. Jenness considered only the validity of the five percent signature
requirement. 403 U.S. at 432.
102. 637 F.2d at 1163-64. The Court in American Party stated that "the required measure of
support - I % of the vote for governor at the last general election and in this instance 22,000
signatures - falls within the outer boundaries of support the State may require before according
political parties ballot position." 415 U.S. at 783.
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ballot access statute based upon the signature requirement alone.
The court distinguished Jenness by applying the "totality"
approach, enunciated in Storer.103 Under this approach, the
signature requirement and the filing deadline could be considered
together to determine their impact on candidates' rights to ballot
access.
When analyzing the impact of the filing deadline, the court
rejected the State's suggestion that the early filing deadline for third
party candidates is offset by a later filing deadline for independent
candidates.10 4 The court reasoned that the effect of the different
filing deadlines was to force party candidates to adopt independent
status. 105 Access requirements for all candidates must be
reasonable, and a party candidate should not be compelled to
change his status to obtain access to the ballot.1 0 6
The court supported its reasoning by examining the practical
effects of the filing deadline on the origins of third party support.
Third party candidates generally develop support when voters
become dissatisfied with the platforms and candidates offered by
the major parties. 107 Thus, the only time to properly measure third
party support is during the time major parties are campaigning and
for a period of time after major party candidates have been selected
in the primary.10 8 The court concluded that the filing deadline was
unnecessarily removed from the most active campaigning period
for major party candidates. 109 The court examined the effect of the
signature requirement and the filing deadline together and found
that the restrictions created a severe impact on the third party
candidates' access to the ballot.
In its final area of analysis, the court explored the interests
which the State claimed were protected by the ballot access
restrictions. The court found that the state has a valid interest in
preventing frivolous, fraudulent, or confusing candidacies.'1 10 The
court determined, however, that there was only a remote danger of
these fragmentary practices by candidates.' 1 Because the danger
was remote, the court recognized no justification for restricting the
103. 637 F.2d at 1164 n.11. The Court in Storer stated that the concept of totality means that "a
number of facially valid provisions of election laws may operate in tandem to produce impermissible
barriers to constitutional rights." 415 U.S. at 737. See American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S.
at 781; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 34.
104. 637 F.2d at 1165 n.12. Party candidates must file 90 days before the primary, while
independent candidates must file 40 days before the general election. Id.
105. Id. at 1165.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1164.
108. Id:
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1165.
111. Id.
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fundamental right to vote for a third party candidate. 112
The McLain court relied upon Storer to employ the compelling
interest test as the standard of review for the ballot access statute. 113
Significantly, the court recognized the existence of a fundamental
right to vote for a third party candidate.114 The court intimated that
the signature requirement and the filing deadline had an
unreasonable impact on third party candidates and voters. Finding
no compelling reason to justify the restriction on ballot access, 115
the court declared that the statute did not employ the least
restrictive means to protect the state's interests. 16 Thus, the court
concluded that the North Dakota ballot access statute was
unconstitutional." 7
Turning to the North Dakota ballot position statutes, the
McLain court considered whether independent candidates were
disadvantaged by their placement on the ballot. The first challenge
involved the "incumbent first" statute" 8 and the possible vote
advantage accruing to the candidate whose name appears first on
the ballot. The court accepted the district court's finding that a
ballot advantage did inure to the candidate in the first position. 119
Because of this inherent unfairness, the court examined whether
the statute violated equal protection.
112. Id. The Court stated that "[tihe remote danger of multitudinous fragmentary groups
cannot justify an immediate and crippling effect on the basic constitutional right to vote for a third
party candidate." Id.
113. Id. at 1163. Under the Storer analysis the Court considers " 'the facts and circumstances
behind the [access] law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of
those who are disadvantaged by the classification.' " Id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,
730 (1974)).
114. 637 F.2d at 1163, 1165. The court commenced its discussion by stating that " 'voting is of
the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure' and requires jealous
protection." Id. at 1163. It concluded by noting that there is a "basic constitutional right to vote for
a third party candidate." Id. at 1165.
115. Id. The only state interest offered was that of preventing frivolous, fraudulent, or confusing
candidacies. Since the court found this insufficient to justify the restriction on rights, the compelling
state interest test was not satisfied. Id.
116. Id. "[lit seems clear to us that North Dakota's access requirements go beyond what is
required by the State's valid interest in the effective functioning of the electoral process." Id.
117. Id.
118. N.D. CENT. CODE S 16-11-06 (1971) (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-06-07.1
(Interim Supp. 1981)). The statute reserves the first or left-hand column of the ballot for the party
receiving the most votes in the last congressional election, the second column to the party with the
next highest number of votes, and so forth. The effect of this statute is that the party winning North
Dakota's lone congressional seat in one election is listed first for all positions in the next election. The
statute does not mention independent candidates, who thus are left with the last column on the
ballot. 637 F.2d at 1166.
119. 637 F.2d at 1166.The State claimed that the district court's finding was incorrect. The
McLain court stated that it would not overturn the district court's finding on this matter unless it was
clearly erroneous. Impressed by the figures presented and the testimony of an expert witness for
McLain, the court noted that the State had not presented any evidence to refute "a definitive
statistical advantage accruing to a candidate whose name appears first." Id. The court substantiated
its agreement with the finding of positional bias by citing similar holdings by other courts. Id. at
1166-67. See Note, Equal Protection in Ballot Positioning, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 816, 821, 842 (1976)
(stating that the order in which names appear on the ballot can influence the outcome of elections,
and suggesting that such statutes be subjected to a compelling interest test).
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The McLain court applied the "rational basis ' test, noting
that the statute's effect on the fundamental right to vote was
attenuated. 120 In applying this test, the court noted that the only
justification offered for the North Dakota ballot arrangement was
the state interest in making the ballot as convenient and intelligible
as possible for the majority of voters. 121 The court reasoned that
this justification admitted a favoritism to voters supporting the
incumbent and major party candidates. The result was a burdening
of the fundamental right to vote possessed by supporters of the
independent candidates. Therefore, the court concluded that the
statute abridged fourteenth amendment rights.1 22
The final challenge to the North Dakota ballot position
statutes involved the "independent column" provision.1 23 That
provision gives party candidates their own column on the ballot
while the independent candidates are grouped together in a
separate column. The court again employed the rational basis test
as the standard of review.1 24 No evidence was presented to support
McLain's claim that the status of independent candidates is
diminished by the ballot design. 25 The court upheld the statute as
necessary to protect the state's legitimate interest in maintaining a
manageable ballot. The statute was further justified by the state's
interest in informing the voters of those candiates who have not
shown the level of support necessary to qualify as a party
candidate. 126  Thus, the court found that the "independent
column" statute was rationally related to the attainment of
legitimate state interests and was therefore constitutional. 127
120. 637 F.2d at 1167. The court adopted the rational basis test, which appears to be the
majority position. It did, however, note the "intentional or purposeful discrimination" test
developed by the Seventh Circuit. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The court examined the trend in other courts to support its holding that the
"incumbent first" statute is unconstitutional. Id.
123. N.D. CENT. CODE S 16-11-05 (4) (1971) (current version at N.D. CENT. Coo 5 16.1-06-05
(Interim Supp. 1981)).
124. 637 F.2d at 1168 n. 16. The court explained: "We accept the rational basis standard as the
appropriate level of review for the simple reason that the fundamental right to vote is somewhat
remotely implicated." Id. at 1168 n. 16.
125. Id. at 1168. McLain claimed that the effect of the statute is to make independents appear as
mere bit performers on a stage dominated by two "stars," the Republicans and Democratic Party
candidates. Id. The Court noted that the affidavit of McLain's expert statistician addressed only the
effect of top placement on the ballot. Id. However, the record shows that if each candidate were given
a separate column in the 1976 presidential election, 11 columns would have been needed. This
evidence supported the State's contention that it was necessary to group the independents to provide
for a manageable ballot. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1169. To substantiate its holding, the court alluded to the fact that the weight of
authority approves of this type of disparate treatment between independent and party candidates. Id.
at 1168.
The court indicated that a single column listing all independent candidates may not be the best
arrangement. It suggested instead that all of the independent candidates could be listed in one
column, while changing the order on a rotating basis. Id. at 1169.
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The result of McLain is the invalidation of both the ballot
access statute 28 and the incumbent first statute. 29 There is some
question, however, about which statutes were in effect at the time
of the McLain decision because the entire election law had been
referred to the voters. 3 0 The North Dakota Legislature has now
enacted new statutes to fill the void created by the McLain
decision.' 3' The Forty-Seventh Legislative Assembly of North
Dakota has amended the ballot access and incumbent first statutes
in an attempt to correct the unconstitutional provisons.
128. N.D. CENT. CODE S 16-04-20 (1971) (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE S 16.1-11-30
(Interim Supp. 1981)).
129. N.D. CENT. CODE S 16-11-06 (1971) (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE S 16.1-06-07.1
(Interim Supp. 1981)).
130. SeeBott, North Dakota's New Election Code, 57 N.D. L. REv. 427 (1981).
131. The new ballot access statute reads as follows:
The following political parties shall be provided with separate columns on
primary election ballots:
1. The republican party.
2. The democratic party.
3. Any party which cast five percent of the total votes cast for governor at the last
general election.
4. Any other party, if a petition signed by at least seven thousand electors of this
state is filed with the secretary of state before four p.m. of the fifty-fifth day
prior to a primary election, asking that a column be provided for such party,
naming it, and stating the platform principles thereof. If such petition is mailed
it shall be in the possession of the secretary of state before four p.m. on the fifty-
fifth day. Candidates of such party shall be entitled to the same rights and
privileges as those of other parties.
Columns shall be arranged so that any column shall be in an inverted position when
the adjacent column or columns are in an upright position.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-30 (Interim Supp. 1981). The new incumbent first statute reads:
The ballot provided for in section 16.1-06-05 shall be arranged as follows:
1. Initially, the names of the candidates of the party casting the highest number of
votes in the state for members of Congress at the last preceding general election
shall be arranged in the first or left-hand column of such ballot; of the party
casting the next highest number of votes in the second column; of the party
casting the next highest number of votes in the third column; and of such other
party as the secretary of state may directi in the fourth and successive columns.
2. In printing each set of official ballots for the various election precincts, all
columns in subsection I shall be rotated so that an equal number of ballots shall
be printed with each in the first or left-hand position.
3. After the ballots are printed as prescribed in subsection 2, they shall be kept in
separate piles and then rearranged by taking one from each pile and placing it
upon the new pile. This rearrangement for political party column rotation shall
be done in conjunction with the required rotation of names within the political
party columns. After the rearrangement is completed, the ballots shall be cut
and packaged for the various election precincts.
4. In presidential election years the names of presidential electors presented in
one certificate of nomination shall be arranged in a group enclosed in brackets
to the right and opposite the center of which shall be printed in bold type the
surname of the presidential candidate represented. To the right and in a line
with such surname, near the margin, shall be placed a single square, and a
mark within such squareshall be designated a vote for all the electors, and such
group shall be placed at the head of the column under the party designated or
represented in such certificate.
5. In. precincts in which voting machines or electronic voting systems are used,
the rotation of columns required by this section, or any rotation necessary to
carry out the intent of this section when a different ballot format is used with
electronic voting systems, shall be performed in the same manner as provided
for the rotation of names on the primary election.
N.D. CENT. CoDE S 16.1-06-07.1 (Interim Supp. 1981).
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The new ballot access statute changes from 15,000 to 7,000 the
number of signatures required. 132 This reduces the required
percentage from three and one-third percent to approximately one
and one-half percent. 133 This significant reduction lowers the North
Dakota signature requirement to a level that appears to avoid
unreasonable burdens on third-party candidates' efforts to show
voter support. 134 The McLain court did not, however, invalidate the
ballot access statute based solely on the signature requirement. It
used the Storer "totality" approach and examined the impact of the
filing deadline to find the overall burden excessive. 135 The
legislature recognized this by moving the filing deadline from more
than ninety days to only fifty-five days before the primary. 136 Thus,
the signature requirement problem appears to be corrected, based
on the significant reduction of the signature requirement and the
change of the filing deadline. The validity of the proposed ballot
access statute will be determined by the validity of the new filing
deadline.
Unlike the issue of permissible signature requirements, the
United States Supreme Court has never directly ruled on a
challenge to a filing deadline. Although there is no controlling
precedent, two state interests have emerged as justifications for
early filing deadlines. The first is the preservation of the integrity of
the primary election as a final expression of the will of the party
majority. 137 A candidate who loses in the primary might attempt to
use the petition process to circumvent the results of the primary.
This justification is inapplicable, however, to ballot access in North
Dakota because the state already has a "sore loser" statute 38 to
serve this purpose.
The second justification for an early filing deadline is the need
for sufficient time to prepare the printed ballot. 139 North Dakota
provides fifty-five days before the primary to enable the secretary of
132. N.D. CENT. CODE S 16.1-11-30(4) (Interim Supp. 1981).
133. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 515 (100th ed.
1979). North Dakota's voting age population is listed as 461,000; 7,000 signatures are approximately
1.5% of the voting population.
134. 637 F.2d at 1163. The McLain court recognized that in 1968, 42 states had signature
requirements of one percent or less. Id. at 1163 n.9. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court
upheld a five percent signature requirement inJenness. 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
135. 637 F.2d at 1164 n. 11, 1165. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
136. N.D. CENT. CODE S 16.1-11-30(4) (Interim Supp. 1981).
137. See Salera v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258, 1267 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem., 424 U.S. 959
(1976) (defeated primary candidate's use of petitioning method would undermine the integrity of the
primary election process).
138. N.D. CENT. CODE S 16.1-13-06 (Interim Supp. 1981). The "sore loser" statute provides
that a defeated primary candidate is ineligible to have his name printed on the general ballot. Id. Cf.
State v. Hall, 73 N.D. 428, 15 N.W.2d 736, 741 (1944) (declared a similar North Dakota "sore
loser" statute unconstitutional).
139. 399 F. Supp. at 1267 (state contended that the early filing deadline is necessary for orderly
preparation of ballot).
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state to print the ballot and validate the filed signatures. 140 Thus,
the time period between the filing deadline and the primary
election seems fair and adequate.
If the validity of the filing deadline was based entirely on
these two state interests, the fifty-five day deadline might be
upheld. North Dakota, however, has a unique provision
concerning third party candidates. It requires that all parties must
participate in the primary election to be eligible for access to the
general election ballot. 141 A different light is shed upon the validity
of the filing deadline when the third party primary requirement is
considered in the context of the McLain court's analysis of the ballot
access statute.
The court in McLain based its invalidation of the ballot access
statute in part on the early filing deadline. The court found that
third party support is most accurately measured when voters
become dissatisfied with the major party candidates chosen in the
primary.1 42 The court reasoned that the early filing deadline
required third party candidates to qualify at a time when the
individual's candidacy may be purely potential and contingent on
later developments. 143 Thus, the proper time for third party
candidates to obtain signatures is after the primary. The court
failed, however, to discuss the implications of North Dakota's
requirement that all parties must participate in the primary election
process.' 44 Obviously, a third party candidate cannot gather
signatures after the primary if the candidate must participate in the
primary. Although the court disapproved of a procedure that
requires third party. candidates to gather signatures before the
primary to gain access to the general election ballot, the new ballot
access law 45  still requires signature gathering before the
primary. 4 6 Thus, the new statute fails to correct a detrimental
140. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-30(4) (Interim Supp. 1981).
141. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 16.1-11-39 (Interim Supp. 1981). Section 16.1-11-30(4) sets out the
only nomination procedure available to third parties - the petition process. N.D. CENT CODE
§ 16.1-11-30(4) (Interim Supp. 1981). Section 16.1-11-39 allows persons nominated in the primary
to be candidates on the general election ballot. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-39 (Interim Supp. 1981).
Section 16.1-13-04 requires certificates of nomination from all candidates for the general election.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 16.1-13-04 (Interim Supp. 1981). Sections 16.1-15-23 and 16.1-15-40 provide
for issuance of certificates of nomination for persons in the primary election. N.D. CENT. CODE
5§ 16.1-15-23, -40 (Interim Supp. 1981). Cf N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-12-02(5) (Interim Supp. 1981)
(section 16.1-12-02(5) requires independents to file petition with 1000 signatures in statewide
elections and 300 signatures in less than statewide elections in order to obtain certificate of
nomination). Taken together, these provisions have the effect of requiring all party candidates to
participate in the primary in order to obtain access to the general election ballot.
142. 637 F.2d at 1164.
143. Id.
144. See supra note 141. The court recognized the existence of this restriction when it stated:
"The North Dakota access statute . . . provides a single method of ballot access for a 'new' political
party." 637 F.2d at 1162 (emphasis added).
145. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-30 (Interim Supp. 1981).
146. Id. In view of the court's analysis of the burden on third party candidates to obtain
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effect specified by the court when it invalidated the early filing
deadline.
Another problem with the new law is that the legislature has
actually lengthened the time the candidates have to file before the
general election. The McLain court found that the ninety day
deadline before the primary and the one hundred fifty day deadline
before the general election were unconstitutional. 147 North Dakota
recently has moved the primary election to the second Tuesday in
June. 14 8 Although the filing deadline is fifty-five days before the
primary, it is now more than one hundred eighty days before the
general election. Thus, third party candidates must now obtain
signatures at a time even further removed from the general election
than that which McLain found unconstitutional. Although the court
has shown a strong disfavor for a filing deadline before the primary,
the new ballot access law retains such a deadline. 14 9 Additionally,
the state lengthened the time period between filing and the general
election.1 50 Thus, the new ballot access statute151 has failed to
correct the filing deadline restrictions on third party candidates
found unconstitutional in McLain. A problem unresolved by the
new election law, and not discussed by the McLain court, is the
unequal treatment of third party candidates, compared to
independent candidates, in terms of ballot access restrictions. 152 A
third party candidate must file a petition with 7,000 signatures
fifty-five days before the primary election. 5 3 The third party
candidate must then participate in the primary in order to gain
access to the general ballot. 15 Independent candidates, however,
can gain access to the general election ballot by filing a petition with
one thousand signatures in statewide elections and three hundred
signatures in less than statewide elections fifty-five days before the
,general election. 55 The legislature apparently intends to prevent
signatures before the primary, 637 F.2d at 1164, even the 7,000 signature requirement may be too
high. The court strongly favored the gathering of signatures after the primary. Id.
147. 637 F.2d at 1163-65. Section 16-04-01 provided that the primary election was on the first
Tuesday in September of general election years. N.D. CENT. CODE S 16-04-01 (1971) (current
version N.D. CENT. CODE S 16.1-11-01 (Interim Supp. 1981)). Section 16-06-01 provided that the
general election take place on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of each even-
numbered year. N.D. CENT. CODE S 16-06-01 (1971) (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-
13-01 (Interim Supp. 1981)).
148. N.D. GENT. CODE S 16.1-11-01 (Interim Supp. 1981). The date for the general election
remains the same. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 16.1-13-01 (Interim Supp. 1981).
149. N.D. CENT. CODE S16.1-11-30(4) (Interim Supp. 1981).
150. N.D. CENT. CODE §S 16.1-11-01, -13-01 (Interim Supp. 1981).
151. N.D. CENT. CODES 16.1-11-30(4) (Interim Supp. 1981).
152. The court discussed the approval of disparate treatment between independent and party
candidates, but only in terms of ballot position. 637 F.2d at 1168.
153. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-30(4) (Interim Supp. 1981).
154. See supra note 141.
155. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 16.1-12-02(5) (Interim Supp. 1981) (signature requirement); N.D.
CENT. CODE S 16.1-12-04 (Interim Supp. 1981) (55-day deadline).
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third parties from gaining automatic access to the primary ballot, a
position enjoyed by parties that receive five percent of the total vote
cast for governor in the last election. 1 56 The restrictions imposed on
third party candidates make the independent candidate status more
favorable. If the third party candidate chooses to run as an
independent, the Democratic and Republican parties benefit,
because regardless of the percentage of vote the independent
candidate receives, that candidate will not have automatic ballot
access in the immediately subsequent election. Furthermore, that
candidate is placed in a separate column designated as
"independent nominations." '' 5 7 The effect of the North Dakota
election law appears to be to discourage third party candidacies.
Considering all the implications of North Dakota's election law, as
well as the court's analysis in McLain, the ballot access law'58
apparently remains unconstitutional.
The North Dakota legislature also revised the "incumbent
first" statute1 59 in light of the McLain holding that this ballot
position format was unconstitutional. 160 The legislature corrected
the problem by setting out a printing and compiling procedure that
rotates the first position on the ballot among all parties. 161 With the
initiation of this procedure, North Dakota will no longer reserve the
first position for incumbents. The unconstitutional aspects of the
statute in that respect appear to have been repaired.
DAVID R. OBERSTAR
156. N.D. CENT. CODE§ 16.1-11-30(3) (1hlerinI Supp. 1981).
157. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1 -06-05(4) (Interim Supp. 1981).
158. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-30 (Interim Supp. 1981). For the text of section 16.1-11-30
see supra note 131.
159. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16. 1-06-07.1 (Interim Supp. 1981).
160. 637 F.2d at 1167.
161. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-06-07.1(2), (3) (Interim Supp. 1981). Robert O. Wefald, North
Dakota Attorney General, issued an opinion on August 17, 1981, which concluded that all general
election ballot columns, including the independent column, be rotated. 81-88 Op. N.D. Att'v Gen.
(Aug. 17, 1981). The opinion based its conclusion on this language in McLain:
[Tihe fairest remedy for a constitutionally defective placement of candidates would
appear to be some form of ballot rotation whereby "first position" votes are shared
equitably by all candidates .... However, due to cost and efficiency factors and voting
machine design, this systenm has proved difficult to implement.... In any case, we do
not now undertake on this record to determine which rotation arrangement is
financially and administratively feasible, although we feel obliged to stress the
constitutional requirement that position advantage must be eliminated as much as is
possible.
637 F.2d at 1169 (citations omitt-1
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